Introduction
Lebanese political parties have, naturally enough, always tried to formulate electoral laws that increase the likelihood of their own victory in parliamentary elections. Often this enhances political and sectarian tensions, resulting in political deadlock. This article sets out both to explore the current impasse over a new electoral law, which Given the politics of electoral law, the penetration of Lebanon by regional and overseas actors, the fractured nature of Lebanese politics and the ongoing Syrian Civil War, the fact that the postponement of the parliamentary elections came about, and that there was an unusually high level of consensus on postponement raises important questions about the nature of Lebanese politics at this juncture of Lebanon's political development. The article leverages its analysis of how disagreement over the electoral law led to the postponement of the elections, in order to investigate how the Syrian conflict has interacted with pressures from above, below and between Lebanese political parties enabling Lebanon, thus far, to avoid the fate of a return to civil war caused by the political, economic and humanitarian consequences of the Syrian conflict. Indeed, Lebanon has instead, as is, in part, evidenced by the very postponement of the elections, entered into a form of stable instability in which the political parties have an interest in avoiding escalation and maintaining Lebanon's stability. The article focuses on the role of Lebanese political parties both because they remain dominant actors and because they are subject to a range of pressures which they must take into account when making decisions.
While the piece does not expressly argue against the traditional narrative of Lebanese political volatility, confessionalism and external penetration, it does suggest that this narrative can be overplayed and that there is the possibility of an elision of interests, political pragmatism and more agency for local players than more 'structural' accounts of Lebanese politics allow.
1 Here, recognition of elements of validity of this structural analysis, coupled with awareness of its weaknesses allows for analysis to be supplemented with insights from securitisation theory, and more specifically here for the development of the concept of the 'elision of interests' to allow us to see beyond predictable 'input-output' scenarios, into societal and elite agency, which works both through and around these structures.
This article thus makes a conscious decision to highlight reasons why the Lebanese political parties might have more agency to decide their own future than is often perceived, and that, common interests, a desire to avoid a return to the horrors of the Civil War and an improved sense of growing Lebanese identity have a role to play in the decision-making of sectarian leaders, alongside the usual explanations provided by a structural understanding of confessional politics.
In order to explore this complex mix of factors, the concept of the 'Elision of Interests'
is employed. While there may be an element of coincidence of interests at play, which is accidental and unexpected, leading to the spectre of uncommon bedfellows, this is too simplistic a notion in its own right to explain what is happening in Lebanon, both in terms of the complexity of alliances and obligations, and in terms of other factors at play which are more hidden. Certainly the analysis below suggests that there is an element of coincidence within the elision of interests but this denies vision and agency to both political leaders and the voters of Lebanon.
The outcomes of the inability to decide on a new electoral law and the continuation of the current power-sharing structure is mirrored in the inability to elect a new president, and as a compromise to vest presidential powers with the prime minister whose own election to that position was, in an interesting parallel, reached through an overwhelming consensus in parliament. This suggests that all parties have a strong elision of interests, made up of a number of factors, in maintaining some level of stability. In this context, stability is taken simply to mean situations where: 'stresses or shocks do not tend to produce large, irreversible changes. This does not mean the system does not react when subjected to stress or shock… Stability means that the reaction is one of a limited, and perhaps predictable nature and that the changes are not irreversible, or lead to a new balance not essentially different from the original'. 2 This definition of stability is useful here because it acknowledges that stability is not an absolute condition but something that is flexible on the surface while retaining the core of the underlying system. In studying Lebanon it is easy to be distracted by rhetoric and the seemingly chaotic nature of its politics, missing the stable nature of its instability.
In order to explore these issues, the article begins by briefly explaining the Lebanese consociational system, which is traditionally seen as shaping the behaviour of political parties. It then explores the recent history of Lebanese electoral law and attempts at its reform. Combined, these two sections outline the crucial backdrop against which events unfold. The paper then examines the domestic, inter-and intrasectarian, disputes over the electoral law in Lebanon, followed by the multiple implications of the Syrian conflict. Clearly, the intersection of inter-and intrasectarian disputes with the implications of the Syrian conflict, contributed to the failure of Lebanese political parties to agree on a new electoral law. How this translated into the postponement of the parliamentary elections is next explored, this discussion is framed through the concept of the prism of the 'elision of interests', outlined above, with additional reference to factors neglected in the usual analysis of outside-in and sectarian influences on Lebanon in order to provide a further dimension to the 'elision of interests' seen in Lebanon.
Finally, the conclusion briefly addresses the implications of the decision to postpone the elections, alongside analysis of what all this may tell us about a Lebanon which has, so far at least, been able to confound those who confidently predicted that it would not be able to prevent a return to its Civil War past, through the vortex of Syria's Civil War present.
The 'Consociational System': Explaining the Behaviour of Lebanon's Political
Parties
The behaviour of Lebanese political parties is often shaped by the intersection of three main factors: intra and inter-sectarian conflicts and external influences, either through external alliances with other countries or regional events. 13 This also means that the representatives of communal groups are often entangled as much in intra-sectarian competition and conflict over the leadership of their respective sects as they are with opposing sects.
Despite these processes, endeavours to strengthen a party's position within its sect are not sufficient to secure victory in parliamentary elections. The distribution of sectarian groups across electoral districts also imposes the need to form intersectarian alliances to secure victory. 'Cross-communal cooperation is essential to obtaining substantial power in Lebanon since all the sectarian groups are political minorities and cannot become a political majority without making coalitions with other groups'. 14 These alliances have ramifications, with political parties often having to make concessions to allies from opposing sects both to secure the persistence of the alliance and to profit in other areas of negotiation, especially in terms of delivering on promises made to constituents. These concessions involve, for instance, relinquishing a parliamentary seat in a certain electoral district, or a cabinet post, to their allies, this is both necessary and dangerous as it can lead to rival intrasectarian parties presenting these deals as being deleterious for the longer term interests of the sect. results instead today appears to be much more pragmatic.
Exploring Lebanese Electoral Law and the Process of Reform
The Lebanese constitution calls for the formulation of an electoral law based on large provinces with the aim of formulating multi-sectarian electoral districts. The idea behind this is that candidates standing for election in mixed-sectarian districts will be forced to adopt a national-level discourse and political platform to be able to mobilise voters from different communal groups. Needless to say, neither the spirit nor the letter of the constitution is truly followed when it comes to electoral law. 
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Two common features have marked electoral laws adopted since the end of the Civil
War. The first is the continuing difficulty of political parties in agreeing the format of electoral law. Deals on electoral law have frequently required the intervention of external players before a workable solution has been found. These 'solutions' are generally based not on a long term resolution of the problem but on a short-term quick fix which leaves one or more groupings with a vested interest in further change. The second characteristic of these short-term fixes is that they are based on a winner-takes-all system, which makes minorities unhappy because they are then unable to have a significant influence on either the result or on the selection of their parliamentary candidates. This is especially the case for Christians who are distributed widely across a number of electoral districts. When it came to negotiating a new electoral law for the 2013 parliamentary elections once again the parties had difficulty in reaching an agreement, and this time there appeared to be little appetite among external powers to attempt to broker an agreement on a new electoral law.
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This lacuna eventually forced the Lebanese political parties to find their own solution.
At this juncture it is useful to briefly examine how electoral law has traditionally been a key element which has been manipulated by external powers, in conjunction with Moreover, attempts by other Sunni parties, in particular the Salafi groups and alJama a al-Islamiyya, at intra-sectarian outbidding motivated the Future Movement to adopt a more critical discourse against the Syrian regime and to employ sectarian language so as to be able to mobilise popular support, especially after the rise of Both sides' rhetoric, naturally enough, appealed to wider discourses rather than prosaic advantages in justifying their support for, or opposition to, the Asad regime.
The FPM based its argument on fear and played on the same themes as Nasrallah. law', this despite the fact that the FPM were already the largest Christian party in parliament. 75 The former Lebanese ambassador to the U.S., Abdullah Abu-Habib, emphasises these divisions: including Hizbollah, is a sign that there is a real interest in keeping the country on something approaching an even keel. The inability to decide on a new president and the subsequent vesting of presidential powers in the post of prime minister also fits this pattern.
Aside from the calculation and bargaining seen above, it is also possible to see how the interests of the parties on these issues elide because of other factors. The first of these is the desire of the vast majority of their constituents to avoid a return to the civil war. Awareness of this danger and the desire not to return to the past is a significant factor which makes it hard to take actions which are perceived to add to the risk of civil strife, and which could undermine electoral support should blame be apportioned for risking peace. 91 The second, related aspect here is the way in which Lebanese national identity (while still weak) has strengthened over time, 92 a particular exemplar of this is the role (and at times near reification) accorded to the Lebanese Army as an institution which stands above the sects and adopts a peacekeeping role between factions. 93 The growing sense of being Lebanese, despite internal differences, interlinks with the trauma of the civil war to create new narratives which politicians cannot ignore. All parties must speak to more than the interests of their sect. While this is encapsulated in the need for cross-sectarian alliances, it is also personified in the extensive recourse to the use of the national flag and the way in which the country can pull together in the face of Israel.
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The final area in which interests elide is rather less wholesome. 95 The end of the civil war brought with it significant foreign direct investment in Lebanon, a great deal of which came from Saudi Arabia. The destruction of infrastructure in the 2006 IsraeliHizbollah war brought a further injection of resources for reconstruction from Iran and the wider international community. All of this investment led to a growing economy and a resurgence in Lebanon's tourist industry, meaning that all sides now have a vested interest in ensuring that economic growth continues. 96 The dark side to this is that opportunities for corruption are rife. 97 This elision of multiple interests has therefore led to a situation where Lebanon has been able to defy predictions of it inevitably being sucked into the conflict in Syria, with predictable catastrophic consequences, it has instead been remarkably resilient in the face of the spillover effects.
Conclusion
The Syrian conflict represents a turning point in Lebanon's political process since the Meanwhile, Lebanon's political parties are all betting on the implications of Syria's misery in the hope that they will weaken their inter-and intra-sectarian opponents.
As the analysis above shows, each coalition also hopes, in part, that they will be able 32 It should be borne in mind here that while many of the parties discussed so far are avowedly secular and at times can and do attract votes and candidates from other communities they tend to think and act in sectarian terms and are known as representing the interests of particular communities. There is also an element of tactical voting at times with for example isolated Shi'a communities in Christian areas voting for the FPM of Aoun in part because of his charisma but mainly because he is allied with the two main Shi'a groupings of Amal and Hizbollah. 33 Election Results 2009. According to the Lebanese constitution, the government is considered to have resigned when more than a third of its ministers resign. Thus, the March 8 Coalition sought to hold the blocking third to be able to veto government decisions. Also, a sectarian party that represents the overwhelming majority of its community is able to veto government decisions since its exclusion from the decision-making process would mean the exclusion of the whole sectarian community that this party represents. 34 The former Deputy of the Speaker of Parliament and head of the Orthodox Gathering, Elie Ferzli, Interviewed 27 November 2014, Hazmieh, Lebanon. 35 Kossayfi, 'Al-Muqabala: Aoun Li-Sleiman'. 36 Bassil, 'Saad: Al-intishar Al-Masihi', p.8. Due to the geographic dispersion of the Christians in many electoral districts, Christian candidates are often forced to weave electoral alliances with Muslim parties and elites which often means supporting their political views and advancing the interests of their Muslim voters, such as employment opportunities. Thus, a law that enables Christian MPs to be elected by mainly Christian voters will ensure that their political views are more reflective of the Christian voters' political aspirations and hopes, and they will seek to advance their community's interests. 37 For more detail on the Maronite role and preference in Lebanese politics see: Haddad, 'The Maronite Legacy'. 38 The 'Orthodox Gathering' electoral law, which is based on PR, if adopted, would lead to the victory of the March 8 Coalition. This is because the Future Movement's parliamentary bloc would lose about half of its MPs, who are non-Sunnis. The political opponents of the Future Movement within the Sunni community, such as the Nasserites who are close to the March 8 Coalition, would be able to win parliamentary seats, since the Future Movement does not represent the overwhelming majority of its sect. Also the PSP will not be able to win all the seats in Druze-dominated districts since many of these districts include its political opponents. 39 Hajj, 'Lebanon's Electoral Law and the Regional Crisis'. 40 The Lebanese President is voted for by parliament and is a position reserved for Maronites, at the time of writing and despite the Presidential term being over on 25 May 2014 the Parliament has been unable to vote to appoint a new President despite fifteen attempts no candidate has been agreed. The system is made harder by both the need for a quorum which was only met in the first round of voting on 23 April 2014 and for a 2/3 majority. In the only round to go ahead the LFP's leader Geagea could only amass 48 votes or 37.5 percent. 
